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Abstract 
In October 2008, in the midst of the Global Financial Crisis (2007–09), the Greek 
government announced a €28 billion ($36 billion) government package. Greek Law 
3723/2008, “Enhancement of Liquidity in the Economy in Response to the Impact of the 
International Financial Crisis,” was passed and approved under European Union State Aid 
rules. The Greek law provided for three voluntary programs: recapitalizations (€5 billion), 
guarantees (€15 billion), and securities (€8 billion). This case study exclusively examines 
the recapitalization program. In this program, the Greek government acquired convertible 
preferred shares in banks in order to build and maintain banks’ Tier 1 capital at a minimum 
of 8% of risk-weighted assets. By July 2009, 10 banks had received capital injections for a 
total of €3.8 billion. 




1 This case study is part of the Yale Program on Financial Stability (YPFS) selection of New Bagehot Project 
modules considering the responses to the Global Financial Crisis that pertain to broad-based capital injection 
programs. 
Cases are available from the Journal of Financial Crises at   
https://elischolar.library.yale.edu/journal-of-financial-crises. 




At a Glance 
The collapse of Lehman Brothers in 
mid-September 2008 and the ensuing 
financial crisis prompted governments 
around the world to take aggressive, 
often unprecedented actions. On 
October 12, 2008, in a summit held in 
Paris, euro area heads of state released 
a concerted European action plan to 
reestablish confidence and the 
functioning of the financial system 
(Euro Summit 2008). 
Days later, the Greek government 
passed a €28 billion ($36 billion) 
package (11.4% of GDP) through Greek 
Law 3723/2008, “Enhancement of 
Liquidity in the Economy in Response 
to the Impact of the International 
Financial Crisis” (Greece 2008a; 
Reuters 2008). The law provided for 
three voluntary programs: 
recapitalizations (€5 billion), 
guarantees (€15 billion), and securities 
(€8 billion). In the recapitalizations, 
the Greek government acquired 
preferred shares in order to build and 
maintain Tier 1 capital ratios of at least 
8% (EC 2008a; Greece 2008a). By July 
2009, 10 banks had received capital 
injections for a total of €3.8 billion. By 
2012, two banks received additional 
capital, bringing the total to 
€5.2 billion. 
Summary Evaluation 
Greek authorities expressed 
satisfaction with the first year of 
implementation of the schemes. In their view, “the schemes had made an important 
contribution to providing a safety net that corresponded well to the market’s needs” (EC 
2010a; EC 2010c). However, in early 2010, Greece entered into a sovereign debt crisis. Its 
Summary of Key Terms 
Purpose: “Enhancement of liquidity in the economy in 
response to the impact of the international financial crisis” 
(Greece 2008a) 
Announcement Date October 15, 2008 
Legal Authority Greek Law 3723/2008; 
EC Treaty Article 87 (3)(b); 
later, Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European 
Union Article 107 (3)(b) 
Date of First Capital 
Injection  
May 2009 (see Figure 1) 
Sunset Date Voluntary participation. No 
sunset dates 
Program Size €5 billion maximum 
Participants 10 banks by July 2009 
Usage 10 banks participated. By July 
2009, €3.8 billion. By 2012, 
€5.2 billion. The Greek 
government acquired 
preferred shares to boost Tier 
1 capital 
Administrators Greek minister of economy 
and finance 
Outcomes By 2014, only three banks had 
repurchased the preferred 
shares. Another three banks 
were liquidated 
Notable Features Bonuses abolished; limits on 
salary 
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large fiscal and current account deficits threatened the financial stability of Europe. In May 
2010, the European Union and International Monetary Fund agreed to provide Greece a 
three-year aid package worth €110 billion (BoG 2014).  
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Context: Greece 2008 
GDP 
$355.6 billion in 2008 
$331.5 billion in 2009 
GDP per capita 
$31,997 in 2008 
$29,771 in 2009 
Sovereign credit rating  
(five-year senior debt) 





Data for 2009: 
Fitch: BBB+ 
Moody’s: A2 
S&P: BBB+ *- 
Size of banking system 
$358.6 billion in total assets in 
2008 
$349.4 billion in total assets in 
2009 
Size of banking system as a percentage of 
GDP 
100.8% in 2008 
105.4% in 2009 
Size of banking system as a percentage of 
financial system 
100% in 2008 
100% in 2009 
Five-bank concentration of banking system 
81% of total banking assets in 
2008 
80% of total banking assets in 
2009 
Foreign involvement in banking system 
14% of total banking assets in 
2008 
14% of total banking assets in 
2009 
Government ownership of banking system None 
Existence of deposit insurance 
Yes in 2008 
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I. Overview 
Background 
The collapse of Lehman Brothers in mid-September 2008 and the ensuing 2007–09 Global 
Financial Crisis (GFC), prompted governments around the world to take aggressive, often 
unprecedented actions. On October 12, 2008, in a summit held in Paris, euro are heads of 
state released the “Declaration on a Concerted European Action Plan of the Euro Area 
Countries,” which committed efforts to reestablish confidence and the well-functioning of 
the financial system (Euro Summit 2008). 
European governments, central banks, and supervisors agreed to support financial 
institutions by facilitating: (a) appropriate liquidity conditions, (b) funding of banks, (c) 
additional capital resources, (d) recapitalizations of distressed banks, (e) flexibility in the 
implementation of accounting rules, and (f) cooperation among European countries (Euro 
Summit 2008). Greece did not start to feel the tremors of the crisis until 2009. Although in 
October 2008, Greek banks had not yet experienced the significant losses or liquidity 
pressure that struck other financial markets, the government intended to protect the Greek 
economy by increasing liquidity and facilitating credit institutions in extending loans to the 
private sector (BoG 2014). 
Program Description 
On October 15, 2008, the Greek government announced a package of up to €28 billion 
($36 billion), estimated at 11.4% of GDP (Mayer Brown 2009; Reuters 2008). Greek Law 
3723/2008, “Enhancement of Liquidity in the Economy in Response to the Impact of the 
International Financial Crisis,” went into effect on October 24, 2008. However, Greek 
authorities committed to the European Commission (EC) that the law would not be applied 
before the EC’s approval (EC 2008a; Greece 2008a). On November 19, 2008, the EC 
authorized the new law under European Union (EU) State Aid rules compatible with Article 
87 (3)(b) of the EC Treaty, limited in time and scope, and “intended to stabilize the markets 
as a response to the global financial crisis.” The Greek law provided for three voluntary 
programs: recapitalizations (€5 billion), guarantees (€15 billion), and securities (€8 
billion) (EC, 2008a). This case study exclusively examines the recapitalization program.  
Through the program, the Greek government acquired preferred shares in banks to 
increase and maintain adequate capital ratios. Eligible institutions included all banks 
licensed by the Bank of Greece (BoG), including subsidiaries of foreign banks (EC 2008a). 
The only means for bank recapitalization were preferred shares, considered Tier 1 capital 
by the BoG. The amount purchased was decided by the Minister of economy and finance, 
based on the advice of the governor of the BoG. The preferred shares were noncumulative 
and considered as noncore Tier 1 capital. Cumulative shares required banks to pay the 
government all dividends owed first, before other dividends were paid. In the case of a 
bank’s liquidation, preferred shares held priority over common shares. Through 
recapitalizations, banks reached a Tier 1 capital ratio of no less than 8%, which had to be 
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maintained throughout the duration of the scheme. The annual fixed rate of return of the 
preferred shares was 10% (EC 2008a). 
Banks had to communicate their interest by February 1, 2009. Originally, the issuance of 
preferred shares had to occur no later than mid-May 2009, but the window could be 
extended up to December 31, 2009. Bank recapitalizations were decided according to 
supervisory criteria, which considered capital adequacy levels, the bank’s size, and the 
credit to small and medium-sized enterprises (EC 2008a). 
The price of the preferred shares was determined as the nominal value of common shares 
of the bank’s most recent issuance. The Greek government covered this amount with Greek 
state bonds paying interest at a spread to the euro interbank offered rate (Euribor), the 
leading benchmark interest rate (Greece 2008a; Petrovic and Tutsch 2009). The Greek law 
stated that recapitalized banks had to repurchase the preferred shares from the 
government within five years and for the amount originally invested in the bank. 
Repurchases of preferred shares could be done using Greek government bonds or cash. In 
the case of government bonds, their nominal value had to equal the nominal value of the 
bonds originally issued for the acquisition of the preferred shares (EC 2008a; Greece 
2008a). 
For recapitalized banks that did not repurchase the shares after six months, Greek 
authorities committed to notify the EC of restructuring plans submitted by the banks. The 
BoG did not allow banks to repurchase the shares if they did not meet minimum capital 
ratios. If, after five years, a bank still did not meet capital adequacy requirements, the 
preferred shares were converted into common shares or other similar instruments. To 
determine the conversion rate, the average of the market value of these securities in the 
last trading year was considered. For cases where the securities were not listed on an 
organized market, the bank’s internal book value of the last fiscal year was considered (EC 
2008a; Greece 2008a). 
The Greek state, through the preferred shares acquired, was allowed to appoint a 
representative to a bank’s board of directors. The state representative attended the bank’s 
general assembly of common shareholders and had veto power on decisions related to 
dividend distribution as well as benefits to the president, managing director, and other 
members of the board of directors. Additionally, recapitalized banks were subject to 
conditions such as caps on salary and benefits, and bans on bonuses. They also were 
restrained from taking any aggressive market strategies or balance sheet expansions (EC 
2008a). 
Outcomes 
By July 2009, recapitalizations totaled €3.8 billion (BoG 2010). The 10 banks recapitalized 
were the EFG Eurobank, Alpha Bank, Agricultural Bank of Greece (ATE), Piraeus Bank, 
National Bank of Greece (NBG), Hellenic Postbank (TT), Attica Bank, Proton Bank, First 
Business Bank (FB), and Panellinia Bank (Boudghene et al. 2011; Triantopoulos 2015). 
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Eight of the 10 bank recapitalizations occurred in May 2009. The other two occurred in July 
2009 (see Figure 1). 
Figure 1: Recapitalizations under Greek Law 3723/2008—Portfolio of Banks’ 





% 2009 Source 
EFG Eurobank 950,125,000 2 May (EC 2012d) 
Alpha Bank 940,000,000 2 May (EC 2012b) 
Agricultural Bank of 
Greece (ATE) 
675,000,000  May (ATE Bank 2010) 
Piraeus Bank 370,000,000 1.2 May (EC 2012e) 
National Bank of Greece 
(NBG) 
350,000,000 0.7 May (EC 2012c) 
Hellenic Postbank (TT) 224,960,000 2.9 May (EC 2014a) 
Attica Bank 100,200,000  May (EC 2016) 
Proton Bank 80,000,000 4.58 May (EC 2012a) 
First Business Bank (FB) 50,000,000 3 July (EC 2014b) 
Panellinia Bank 28,300,000 5 July (EC 2015) 
Total 3,768,585,000 
   
 
*Percent of risk-weighted assets of the bank at the time. 
 
Source: Triantopoulos 2015. 
In addition to the bank recapitalizations performed by the Greek government in May and 
July of 2009, by November 2009, five banks had completed capital increases from private 
investors for €2.2 billion (BoG 2009). There were no further recapitalizations under Greek 
Law 3723/2008 until the end of 2011 (Triantopoulos 2015). 
Emporiki Bank decided not to participate in the Greek government package and instead 
relied on private shareholders. In February 2009, Emporiki Bank’s shareholders approved 
an €850 million rights issue to strengthen capital and liquidity. Its parent company, Credit 
Agricole, subscribed and raised its holding in Emporiki Bank to 82%. In July 2009, 
Emporiki Bank reported a €190 million net loss corresponding to the second quarter of 
2009 (Mayer Brown 2009). 
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Initially, in 2008, Greek banks were reluctant to participate in recapitalizations due to 
potential negative market reactions (stigma effect), concerned that their subscription could 
indicate weakness (BoG 2014). A representative from the BoG pointed out that given the 
magnitude of the financial crisis seen by the end of 2008, and the trends and expectations 
of a prolonged period of financial turmoil and deteriorating asset quality, over a period of 
time, the BoG informally persuaded Greek banks to participate in recapitalizations. 
In the context of the GFC, Greece was the first major western European country to have its 
credit rating downgraded in January 2009. Standard & Poor’s (S&P) projected lack of 
economic growth in Greece and loss of competitiveness in the economy. In February 2009, 
Moody’s downgraded Greece from positive to stable, projecting no rating improvements for 
the following year and a half. Additionally, in 2009, Moody’s revised negatively the outlook 
on the financial strength, long-term deposit, and debt ratings of four Greek banks: National 
Bank of Greece, EFG Eurobank, Alpha Bank, and Piraeus Bank. In May 2009, S&P 
downgraded five Greek banks: EFG Eurobank, Piraeus Bank, Emporiki Bank of Greece, 
National Bank of Greece, and Alpha Bank (Mayer Brown 2009). In the first months of 2010, 
as Greece entered a sovereign debt crisis, its rating was significantly downgraded by all 
major international rating agencies (BoG 2014). 
In 2011, the Agricultural Bank of Greece repurchased the €675 million of preferred shares 
from the Greek government (Triantopoulos 2015; see Figure 2). In December 2011, the EC 
approved additional capital injections of €1 billion for the NBG and €380 million for 
Piraeus Bank (around 1.1% of risk-weighted assets) (EC 2011). In 2012, the total amount 
granted under the law reached €5.2 billion, of which €4.5 billion was outstanding. In 2014, 
Piraeus Bank and Alpha Bank repurchased the preferred shares from the Greek 
government for €1.7 billion (Triantopoulos 2015). By 2014, only three banks had repaid 
the total value of the preferred shares to the government. The total outstanding 
government investment stood at €2.8 billion. Three banks were liquidated: Proton Bank in 
2011, and Hellenic Postbank and First Business Bank in 2013 (BoG 2011; BoG 2013a; BoG 
2013b; Triantopoulos 2015).  
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Figure 2: Public Revenues from the Banking Funding Support, 2009–2014 
 
Source: Triantopoulos 2015, 69.  
The GFC hit the Greek economy with some delay. A slowdown in credit expansion to the 
private sector became significant only in 2009. In early 2010, the GFC turned into a 
sovereign debt crisis for some European countries. The Greek government’s credit rating 
was downgraded by international rating agencies. Greek banks faced difficulty accessing 
funding markets as borrowing costs increased while the value of the Greek bonds in their 
portfolios diminished. Greece’s large fiscal and current account deficits threatened the 
financial stability of Europe. In May 2010, the EU and IMF agreed to provide a three-year 
aid package worth €110 billion (BoG 2014). 
II. Key Design Decisions 
1. The recapitalization scheme for Greek banks was part of a package approved by 
the European Commission in late 2008. 
On October 15, 2008, the Greek government announced a €28 billion ($36 billion) package 
estimated at 11.4% of GDP. The Greek package included three pillars: bank 
recapitalizations (€5 billion), guarantees on debt issuance by banks (€15 billion), and 
liquidity support via special government bonds (€8 billion) (EC 2008a; Greece 2008a; 
Mayer Brown 2009; Reuters 2008). The recapitalization scheme was not aimed at 
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distressed banks. It was aimed at strengthening capital ratios against possible losses (EC 
2008a). 
2. Greek Law 3723/2008, “Enhancement of Liquidity in the Economy in Response 
to the Impact of the International Financial Crisis,” was passed in late October 
2008. 
Greek Law 3723/2008, “Enhancement of Liquidity in the Economy in Response to the 
Impact of the International Financial Crisis,” went into effect on October 24, 2008, less than 
two weeks from its announcement. However, the Greek authorities committed that the law 
would not be applied before the European Commission’s approval (EC 2008a). The Bank of 
Greece contributed significantly in the drafting of the law. It provided technical support 
and recommendations on the financial support to banks, based on capital adequacy and 
liquidity needs (BoG 2014). 
3. The EC approved the Greek law under EU State Aid rules compatible with the EC 
Treaty. 
On November 19, 2008, the EC authorized the Greek package under EU State Aid rules 
compatible with Article 87 (3)(b) of the EC Treaty that permits the use of State Aid to 
“remedy a serious disturbance in the economy of a Member State” (EC 2008a). 
4. Greece and other European countries communicated government interventions 
to contain the global financial crisis. 
On October 12, 2008, in a summit held in Paris, euro area heads of state released the 
“Declaration on a Concerted European Action Plan of the Euro Area Countries,” which 
committed efforts to reestablish confidence and the well-functioning of the financial 
system. European governments, central banks, and supervisors agreed to support financial 
institutions by facilitating: (a) appropriate liquidity conditions, (b) funding of banks, (c) 
additional capital resources, (d) recapitalizations of distressed banks, (e) flexibility in the 
implementation of accounting rules, and (f) cooperation among European countries (Euro 
Summit 2008). 
5. The Greek minister of economy and finance managed the recapitalization 
scheme with advice from the BoG. 
The Supervisory Council was set up by Greek law and was chaired by the Greek minister of 
economy and finance with the participation of the BoG governor, the deputy minister of 
economy and finance, and the Greek state’s representatives at the boards of directors of the 
participating banks. The Council convened monthly to coordinate the implementation of 
the law and make sure depositors, borrowers, and the Greek economy benefited from the 
scheme (EC 2008a). 
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6. Limited by the EU State Aid rule, the Greek government was allowed to acquire 
up to €5 billion in preferred shares in banks in total. 
The EU State Aid was intended to be limited in time and scope. The Greek government 
could acquire up to €5 billion in preferred shares in banks that chose to participate in the 
recapitalization scheme (EC 2008a). 
7. Eligible institutions included all banks authorized to operate in Greece 
(including subsidiaries of foreign banks), but their actual participation was 
decided by the minister of economy and finance, based on the recommendation 
of the BoG governor. 
Eligible institutions included all banks authorized to operate in Greece with license from 
the BoG, including subsidiaries of foreign banks. Banks could increase their capital by 
issuing preferred shares regardless of whether their transferable securities were listed in 
organized markets or the stock exchange (EC 2008a). 
Initially, in 2008, Greek banks were reluctant to participate in recapitalizations due to 
potential negative market reactions (stigma effect), concerned that their subscription could 
indicate weakness (BoG 2014). A representative from the BoG pointed out that given the 
magnitude of the financial crisis seen by the end of 2008, and the trends and expectations 
of a prolonged period of financial turmoil and deteriorating asset quality, over a period of 
time, the BoG informally persuaded Greek banks to participate in recapitalizations. 
8. Bank recapitalizations followed supervisory criteria based on capital adequacy 
levels, size, and credit to small and medium-sized enterprises. 
Banks willing to participate in the recapitalization scheme had to communicate their 
interest by February 1, 2009. Then, they had to issue the preferred shares by May 19, 2009 
(six months after the approval of the scheme). The window to issue the preferred shares 
could be extended up to December 31, 2009, upon the European Commission’s approval 
(EC 2008a). 
Bank recapitalizations were accepted based on supervisory criteria. First, the amount of 
capital required to meet the capital adequacy level of a Tier 1 ratio between 8% and 10%, 
as defined by the BoG, was weighted at 50% of the total evaluation. Second, the size of the 
bank, its market share, and its importance in preserving financial stability was weighted at 
40%. And third, the contribution of the bank in financing small and medium-sized 
enterprises and residential loans was weighted at 10% (EC 2008a). 
The amount to purchase was decided by the minister of economy and finance, based on the 
recommendation of the governor of the BoG (EC 2008a). The Greek government issued 
Greek government bonds paying interest set at a spread to Euribor to cover the price of the 
preferred shares, which was determined as the nominal value of common shares of the 
bank’s most recent issuance (Greece 2008a). 
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In the case of the Proton Bank Group, after the 2009 recapitalization of €80 million, its 
balance sheet increased from €1.9 billion in 2008 to €2.9 billion in 2009, and to €4.3 billion 
in 2010. Thus, its balance sheet grew by more than 100% from 2008 to 2010 (EC 2012a). In 
2011, the BoG withdrew the license of Proton bank and placed the entity in liquidation 
(BoG 2011). 
9. Recapitalizations consisted of preferred shares exclusively and held priority 
over common shares or other similar instruments in case of a bank’s liquidation. 
In the recapitalizations, the Greek government acquired exclusively preferred shares as 
they were considered Tier 1 capital by the BoG. Through the recapitalizations, banks 
reached a Tier 1 capital ratio of 8% or above, which had to be maintained throughout the 
duration of the scheme. The capital adequacy ratios set by the BoG also corresponded with 
8% of Tier 1 capital (EC 2008a). 
The preferred shares paid a 10% dividend. They were noncumulative and considered 
noncore Tier 1 capital. Based on EU State Aid rules, recapitalizations had to be performed 
at terms that minimized the amount of aid. Data at the time, under distressed market 
conditions, showed that the yield for hybrid Tier 1 capital, such as preferred shares, was 
around 15% or more. However, the European Commission recognized that setting a higher 
dividend yield, in the vicinity of that market level, would discourage banks from 
participating in the recapitalizations. Additionally, the EC intended to adjust to long-term 
market conditions and not to impose unfavorable conditions at the time. The EC noted in 
approving the Greek program that in the UK and Germany, the programs had come with 
strict behavioral conditions and paid dividend yields of 12% and 10%, respectively. 
Consequently, the commission positively observed that if equivalent behavioral conditions 
were met, the 10% yield in the Greek case was appropriate and reflected a market-oriented 
remuneration on the capital injected. In the case of a bank’s liquidation, preferred shares 
held priority over common shares (EC 2008a). 
10. Banks that did not repurchase the shares after six months were required to 
submit restructuring plans. 
For recapitalized banks that did not repurchase the shares after six months, Greek 
authorities committed to notify the Commission of restructuring plans submitted by the 
participating banks (EC 2009). Cases of conversions of preferred shares into common 
shares were also considered within the restructuring plan (EC 2008a). 
The commission noted that the restructuring plans were the foundation of the Community 
Guidelines on State Aid for Rescuing and Restructuring Firms in Difficulty for the 
commission’s understanding of EC Article 87 (3)(c) for aid of this kind. It was important 
that banks returned to long-term viability and the plans were adequately scrutinized. The 
EC did not require restructuring plans for banks that repurchased the preferred shares 
within six months (EC 2008a). Additionally, if further recapitalizations were needed, Greek 
authorities ensured that future beneficiary banks were fundamentally sound, which they 
scrutinized ex ante, and provided this information to the commission at the time of a 
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capital injection. Greek authorities notified the European Commission of a restructuring 
plan within six months of the capital injection. If the Greek government intended to 
recapitalize a bank previously recapitalized, then Greek authorities had to present an 
individual notification for the commission’s approval (EC 2008a).  
11. The Greek government was allowed to appoint a representative to a bank’s 
board of directors. 
The Greek state, through the preferred shares acquired, was allowed to appoint a 
representative in a bank’s board of directors. The state representative attended the bank’s 
general assembly of common shareholders and had veto power on decisions related to 
dividends distribution as well as benefits to the president, managing director, and other 
members of the board of directors. This came into consideration if the state representative 
considered that a decision “may jeopardize the interests of depositors or substantially 
affect the solvency and the good functioning of the bank” (EC 2008a). 
12. Banks that received government capital were subject to other behavioral 
conditions. 
The behavioral conditions imposed on recapitalized banks included:  
(a) The salary and benefits of the president, the managing director and other members 
of the board of directors, general directors, and deputy general directors of 
recapitalized banks could not surpass the salary and benefits of the governor of the 
BoG. The law required banks to review their activities regularly and limit the 
remuneration of bank executives involved in a state intervention (EC 2008a). 
(b) Any additional bonuses were abolished throughout the duration of the 
recapitalization. 
(c) Although the Greek law allowed dividend distribution of up to 35% of distributable 
profits, in principle, no dividends were paid out while the Greek government was 
involved (ATE Bank 2010; Greece 2008b; Mayer Brown 2009). The commission 
declared that, based on Article 1(3) of the Greek law and by decision of the Greek 
minister of economy and finance, the state representative appointed at the bank 
board of directors would ensure through their veto rights that no dividends were 
distributed until government participation had been redeemed (the veto right could 
not be overruled). The commission noted that an important behavioral constraint 
was the ban on dividends, because it provided an incentive for the bank’s common 
shareholders to repurchase the state’s preferred shares as early as possible. 
Through the ban on dividends, the capital base of the bank was built by the 
accumulation of reserves, in line with the overall goal of the program. In cases of 
dividend distribution, Greek authorities notified the EC to seek its approval. 
 
In June 2009, then–BOG Governor George A. Provopoulos expressed that: 
(d) “In matters relating to banking supervision and financial stability there is no room 
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for even the slightest complacency. My main priority, since the first day I took up my 
duties, has been to protect financial stability. In view of the increased risks resulting 
from the weakening economic activity, high market volatility and the prevailing 
liquidity conditions, I have asked banks to implement the kind of policies that 
ensure financial resilience, stability and health. 
(e) I have also urged them to make use of the government plan, so as to enhance 
liquidity in the economy. I have asked them not to distribute any dividends, to 
substantially increase their provisions for bad debts, and to reduce bonuses to their 
executives. All these measures create additional ‘cushions’ that shield banks in the 
difficult times we are experiencing. Nevertheless, continued vigilance is required” 
(BoG 2014). 
(f) Banks recapitalized had to report to the BoG every three months on the specific use 
of the capital injected. Based on these reports, the BoG prepared semiannual reports 
to be submitted to the commission that outlined the use of the capital injected, 
implementation of business plans, and any restructuring plans. If a bank seriously 
violated the terms and conditions of the recapitalization, the minister of economy 
and finance, following a proposal of the BoG governor, could impose sanctions or 
cancel government support in full or in part.  
(g) Banks were expected to restrain from any aggressive market strategies or 
advertising, particularly against competitors not receiving equal coverage or not 
part of the scheme. 
(h) Banks were expected to refrain from expanding their activities or pursuing different 
purposes that might unduly distort competition. Banks were forced to ensure that, 
during the government’s involvement in the recapitalization, the average increase of 
the total assets did not surpass the highest of these amounts: (a) the annual growth 
rate of the Greek nominal GDP of the previous year, (b) the average rate of increase 
of the Greek banking sector’s total assets for the 1987–2007 period, or (c) the 
average rate of increase of the EU banking sector’s total assets for the previous six 
months. 
Compliance with these obligations was controlled by the Supervisory Council and based on 
the BoG’s reports. The Supervisory Council was set up by the Greek law and was chaired by 
the Greek minister of economy and finance with the participation of the BoG governor, the 
deputy minister of economy and finance, and the Greek state’s representatives at the 
boards of directors of the participating banks. The Council convened monthly to coordinate 
the implementation of the law and make sure depositors, borrowers, and the Greek 
economy benefited from the scheme (EC 2008a). 
13. Recapitalized banks had to repurchase the preferred shares acquired by the 
Greek government within five years or face conversion into common shares. 
Greek law stated that recapitalized banks had to repurchase the preferred shares from the 
Greek government within five years and for the amount originally invested in the bank. The 
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BoG prevented bank repurchases in cases where capital adequacy ratios were not met. If, 
after five years, the bank could not make the repurchase because of capital adequacy 
requirements, the preferred shares were converted into common shares or other similar 
instruments. To determine the conversion rate, the average of the market value of these 
securities in the last trading year was considered. For cases where the securities were not 
listed on an organized market, the bank’s internal book value of the last fiscal year was 
considered (EC 2008a). 
III. Evaluation 
Although there are limited evaluations specific to the Greek recapitalization scheme, Greek 
authorities expressed satisfaction with the first year of implementation of the schemes. In 
their view, “a stock-taking of their effectiveness so far reveals that the measures adopted 
have provided a safety net that corresponds well to the market’s needs” (EC 2010a; EC 
2010c). 
Initially, banks were reluctant to participate in the government measures due to potential 
negative market reactions (stigma effect). The BoG urged banks to participate to solidify 
their capital bases. Through the recapitalizations, banks improved their capital positions 
and the contraction of credit growth was significantly less than anticipated given the depth 
and length of the recession (BoG 2014). 
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Summary of Program 
(EC 2008a) State Aid N 560/2008. Support Measures for Credit Institutions in Greece 




(Greece 2008a) Enhancement of Liquidity in the Economy in Response to the Impact of the 
International Financial Crisis  




(EC 2008b) Recapitalisation Communication 
Communication provided by the European Commission on the recapitalization of financial 
institutions during the financial crisis: limitation of aid to the minimum necessary and 
safeguards against undue distortions of competition.  
https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/library/recapitalisation-communication. 
(Mayer Brown 2009) Summary of Government Interventions in Financial Markets: Greece. 




(European Commission, October 7, 2008) Press Release of the 2894th The European 
Economic and Financial Affairs Council (ECOFIN) Meeting.  




(Reuters 2008). Greece to Spend 11 Pct of GDP to Shield Banks. 
Greece reportedly to spend up to 11.4 percent of GDP to help banks deal with the crisis. 
https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/library/greece-spend-11-pct-gdp-shield-banks. 
Reports/Assessments 
(BoG 2014)The Chronicle of the Great Crisis: The Bank of Greece 2008-2013: Public 
Interventions and Institutional Actions to Safeguard Financial Stability and Overcome the 
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Crisis. 




(Petrovic and Tutsch 2009) National Rescue Measures in Response to the Current Financial 
Crisis A comprehensive overview of measures introduced by the 27 EU Member States from 
October 2008 through June 2009. 
https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/node/4151. 
(Triantopoulos 2015)Greek Economic Outlook 2015. Greek Banking Support Framework: A 
First  Attempt  
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VI. Appendix: Timeline 
Date Event Description 
Oct./07/2008 The European Economic and Financial 
Affairs Council (ECOFIN) met to plan a 
response to the global financial crisis. 
ECOFIN outlined a coordinated approach in 
response to the crisis. 
Oct./12/2008 Declaration on a concerted European 
action plan of the euro area countries. 
Summit of heads of state of euro area countries 
in Paris. 
Oct./13/2008 The European Commission (EC) released 
the banking communication. 
The EC provided guidance on the application of 
State Aid measures for banks in the context of 
the global financial crisis. 
It highlighted that recapitalization schemes 
were important measures member states could 
take to preserve financial stability and proper 
functioning of financial markets.  
Oct./15/2008 Announcement of the €28 billion Greek 
government package. 
The package included capital injections, 
guarantees on debt issuance by banks, and 
liquidity support via special government bonds 
(Mayer Brown 2009). 
Oct./24/2008 Greek Law 3723/2008 was enacted on 
“the enhancement of liquidity in the 
economy in response to the impact of the 
international financial crisis.” 
The Greek law entered into force, but Greek 
authorities committed that the law would not 
apply until the EC’s approval (EC 2008a). 
Nov./19/2008 The EC approved the Greek package. State Aid N 560/2008 – Greece. “Support 
Measures for the Credit Institutions in Greece.” 
Nov./28/2008 The Greek minister of economy and 
finance implemented Greek Law 
3723/2008. 
Decision 54201/B 2884/26.11.2008 (Petrovic 
and Tutsch 2009, 41). 
Dec./05/2008 ECOFIN anticipated the need for further 
recapitalizations. 
ECOFIN expressed that it “recognized the need 
for further guidance for precautionary 
recapitalizations to sustain credit and called for 
its urgent adoption by the EC (EC 2008b). 
Jan./15/2009 The EC released a communication for 
recapitalization schemes. 
The communication “The recapitalization of 
financial institutions in the current financial 
crisis: limitation of aid to the minimum 
necessary and safeguards against undue 
distortions of competition” provided guidance 
for new recapitalization schemes and 
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adjustments of existing ones (EU 2009). 
Sep./18/2009 The EC approved amendments to the 
Greek package and prolonged it until 
December 31, 2009. 
“Prolongation and amendment of the Support 
Measures for the Credit Institutions in Greece.” 
State Aid Case N 504/2009 (EC 2009). 
Jan./25/2010 The EC approved a second prolongation 
until June 30, 2010. 
“Prolongation of the Support Measures for the 
Credit Institutions in Greece.” State Aid Case N 
690/2009 (EC 2010a). 
May/12/2010 Greece increased the government 
package from €28 billion to €43 billion 
by increasing the guarantee scheme. 
“Amendment to the Support Measures for the 
Credit Institutions in Greece.” State Aid Case N 
163/2010 (EC 2010b). 
June/30/2010 The EC approved amendments to the 
Greek package and a third prolongation 
until December 31, 2010. The 
government package increased from €43 
billion to €68 billion by increasing the 
guarantee scheme. 
“Extension and Amendment to the Support 
Measures for the Credit Institutions in Greece.” 
State Aid Case N 260/2010 (EC 2010c). 
Dec./21/2010 The EC approved a fourth prolongation 
of the Greek package until June 30, 2011. 
“Fourth Extension of the Support Measures for 
the Credit Institutions in Greece”. EC State Aid 
Case 31998. 
 
Apr./04/2011 The EC approved an amendment. The 
government package increased from €68 
billion to €98 billion by increasing the 
guarantee scheme. 
“Amendment to the Support Measures for the 
Credit Institutions in Greece.” EC State Aid Case 
32767. 
June/27/2011 The EC approved a fifth prolongation of 
the Greek package until December 21, 
2011.  
“Fifth Prolongation of the Support Measures for 
the Credit Institutions in Greece.” EC State Aid 
Case 33153. 
Feb./06/2012 The EC approved a sixth prolongation of 
the Greek package until June 30, 2012.  
“Sixth Prolongation of the Support Measures for 
the Credit Institutions in Greece.” EC State Aid 
Case 34149. 
July/06/2012 The EC approved a seventh prolongation 
of the Greek package until December 31, 
2012. 
“Seventh Prolongation of the Support Scheme 
for Credit Institutions in Greece." EC State Aid 
Case 35002. 
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